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The Enduring Local Harm
from Recessions
Brad J. Hershbein and Bryan A. Stuart
ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
n We study the impacts of
each recession over the past 50
years on the economic health
of metro areas.
n Areas that suffer larger
employment losses during a
recession never fully recover
their employment relative to
less-affected areas.
n Badly hit areas also have
less population growth, and
the share of the population
that is employed, as well as per
capita income, are lower for
at least a decade.
n These areas also grow
relatively older and often
become less educated, with
fewer management and
professional jobs.
n Recessions play a role
in some areas falling
economically behind others,
as employment opportunities
shift across areas more quickly
than people do.
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Recessions receive enormous attention from
researchers, policymakers, and the public.
Most of this attention focuses on short-run,
nationwide measures like the unemployment
rate and gross domestic product. Tese outcomes
are clearly important, but many of the broader
and longer-lasting consequences of recessions
remain uncertain. Tis is particularly true for
how recessions afect local labor markets, such as
metropolitan areas.
In particular, do badly afected areas eventually
recover to be on par with their less-afected peers,
or is the economic harm sufered during recessions
persistent, possibly putting severely hit areas on a
permanently lower trajectory for employment and
earnings? To answer this question, we examine the
long-term impacts of fve national recessions—
from the one in the mid-1970s through the Great
Recession—on employment, population, earnings,
and other outcomes for 363 metropolitan areas
in the United States. Because the severity of each
recession varied across these areas—some had
heavy losses in employment while others actually
gained jobs—we essentially compare worse-hit
places to less-afected places, tracking outcomes for
several years afer each recession’s end.
We fnd that, for every recession, harder-hit
metropolitan areas sufer long-lasting economic
harm relative to less-afected areas. Teir paths
diverge, and the former group falls behind in
terms of employment, population, employment
rates, and per capita earnings. Specifcally, an
area that loses 5 percent of its employment
during a recession—the typical loss during the
Great Recession—on average has 6.2 percent less
employment than it otherwise would have almost
a decade later. Population also falls, mostly because
of fewer people moving in rather than more people
moving out, but this loss is not as large as that for
employment. Consequently, the share of the adult
population that is employed falls by 2 percentage

points, or 1 out of every 50 people. Tis decline in
the employment rate also leads to a long-term 3.2
percent drop in per capita earnings.
Moreover, these persistent economic impacts
are ofen accompanied by modest, but not trivial,
changes in the demographic characteristics of
afected places. Te share of residents aged 65 and
over increases, while the share aged 15 through 39

We fnd that, for every recession,
harder-hit metropolitan areas sufer
long-lasting economic harm relative
to less-afected areas.
falls. Fewer workers are employed in managerial,
professional, and technical occupations, and more
are employed in manual and service jobs. Te
share of residents with a college degree falls. Even
adjusting for these demographic changes, however,
the majority of the employment and earnings
impacts remain.
Our fndings have important implications for
the reallocation of economic activity across places,
labor market dynamism, economic opportunities
for workers and their children, and optimal policy
responses. While our social safety net is mostly set
up to respond to current (or very recent) economic
conditions, our fnding that recessions have
enduring impacts on places long afer the national
economy has recovered suggests that targeting
aid based on a longer economic history may be
necessary to preserve economic opportunity for all.

How Recessions Can Have Long-Lasting
Local Efects…
Recessions are periods of depressed economic
activity, and they coincide with large cuts to
employment as the demand for labor falls. Tese
declines generally vary across places because of
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diferences in industry specialization or
in the types of workers afected, as well
as the nature of the recession.
If during a recession most frms
temporarily lay of workers or reduce
their hours, then employment, wages,
and the share of people employed are

Areas that lost 5 percent more
of their employment during a
recession have employment rates
1–2 percentage points lower,
even up to a decade later.
likely to quickly revert to previous
trends once conditions improve. If,
on the other hand, a recession causes
employers to change their production
processes or shut down, there could
be long-term scarring in a local labor
market. Tis could also happen if highly
skilled (and higher-earning) workers

are more likely to leave for other areas
not as badly afected, or if the recession
diverts would-be in-migrants—both
people and businesses—to other areas.
Recent research has found support
for all these possibilities, but has not
systematically examined the longterm outcomes of places badly hit by
recessions.

…and Vary across Places
We thus look at places as defned
by metropolitan areas. Tese 363 areas
are groups of counties tied together
by commuting patterns and having an
urban center of at least 50,000 people.
Although they exclude rural areas,
they account for between 66 and 83
percent of the country’s people and
jobs between 1969 and 2016. Tese
metropolitan areas proxy for local labor
markets, the places in which people
work and look for jobs. (Our results are
similar when we examine commuting
zones, which include rural areas.)

Figure 1 The Severity of the Great Recession Varied Considerably across Metropolitan Areas

Te severity of recessions varies
considerably across metropolitan areas.
Figure 1 shows this variation for the
last recession we analyze, the Great
Recession of 2007–2009. We measure
the local severity of the recession by
the change in employment between the
national peak and the national trough—
in this case between 2007 and 2009—in
each metropolitan area. On the map,
areas with darker red shading sufered
greater proportional employment
losses. Although some entire states were
badly afected—Michigan, notably, as
well as the Sun Belt states of Florida and
Arizona—there are also several cases
where neighboring areas fared quite
diferently, such as Providence and
Boston, or Pittsburgh and Youngstown.
Our analysis essentially compares
the long-term outcomes of places that
were more severely afected to those
that were less afected, and we do this
separately for each of the past fve
recessions: the ones in 1973–1975,
1980–1982, 1990–1991, 2001, and
2007–2009. Of course, the metropolitan
areas that sufered severe employment
losses may have difered in several
ways from those with smaller losses,
and it is important to control for these
diferences. Terefore, we are also
careful to account for diferences in
prerecession population growth (by
age group), and we implicitly compare
metropolitan areas within each of nine
regions in the country. Moreover, our
analytical approach, called an event
study, allows us to confrm that moreand less-afected areas were trending
similarly before the recession; this helps
ensure that the less-afected areas serve
as a good comparison to what would
have happened in the more-afected
areas had the recession there not been
as severe.

Local Recessions Don’t Just Fade Away

NOTE: Figure shows the change in the natural log of employment (approximately equal to the percent change in
employment) between 2007 and 2009 for 363 metropolitan areas (Core-Based Statistical Areas, as defned in 2003 by
the Ofce of Management and Budget). Areas in darker colors experienced larger employment losses.
SOURCE: Authors’ analysis of Bureau of Economic Analysis Regional data.
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When we implement this approach,
we fnd that employment doesn’t just
fall more immediately in harder-hit
areas (this happens by construction),
but it remains depressed for at least a
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decade, and ofen longer. Specifcally,
we estimate that for every additional
1 percent drop in employment during
a recession, employment is between
0.8 and 1.7 percent lower than it
otherwise would have been seven to
nine years afer the recession ended.
For a Great Recession–sized shock,
when a 5 percent employment loss was
not unusual, this means a long-term
reduction in employment of roughly
4–8 percent. To be clear, we don’t mean
that employment is necessarily lower
than it was before the recession began,
but that it is lower than it would have
been in the absence of the recession.
Put diferently, growth is on a lower
trajectory.
We also fnd this same pattern of
persistently lower growth in an area’s
population. Every 1 percent greater
employment loss during a recession
translates to between 0.3 and 0.7
percent lower population nearly a
decade later. One might think this is
driven by people moving out of badly
afected areas, but we fnd the opposite.
Fewer people move away; rather, the
population loss occurs because fewer
people subsequently move into hard-hit
areas, and this efect lasts a long time.
Moreover, the composition of the
population shifs, with the population
of badly hit areas aging and ofentimes
having fewer highly educated
professional workers than less-afected
areas.
Put together, the long-term impacts
on employment are greater than
those on population, and thus the
employment rate—the share of people
with jobs—also sufers long-term
declines in areas that experienced more
severe recessions. We illustrate this
pattern in Figure 2, which shows these
declines for each recession. For each
panel, the two vertical lines indicate the
beginning and end of the recession (in
terms of employment). Tat the thick
blue line is near 0 before the recession
indicates that areas have similar trends
in the employment rate, regardless of
how large their employment losses
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Figure 2 In Every Recession, Harder-Hit Areas Sufer Persistent Declines in
Employment Rates
B: 1980-1982 recession

A: 1973-1975 recession
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NOTE: Figure shows, separately for each recession, the impact of a 1 percent greater employment loss during a
recession (between the vertical lines) on the employment rate over time. Complete recovery is reached when the
solid blue line returns to 0. Dashed lines indicate 95 percent confdence intervals.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using Bureau of Economic Analysis Regional data (employment) and Surveillance,
Epidemiology, and End Results data (population).

will be. In each case, as expected, the
employment rate falls sharply during
the recession. Tis decline persists,
however, once the recession is over:
for the 1973–1975, 1990–1991, and
2001 recessions, there appears to
be no recovery at all, while there is
only incomplete recovery for the
1980–1982 and 2007–2009 recessions.
Consequently, areas that lost 5 percent
more of their employment during a
recession have employment rates 1–2
percentage points lower, even up to a
decade later. For a typical metropolitan

area of 150,000 workers, that’s 1,500 to
3,000 fewer people with jobs.

Policy Implications
Te long-term impacts of local
recessions also afect income, and
we estimate that in badly hit areas,
long-term per capita earnings are
between 1 and 5 percent lower than
they would have been in the absence
of the recession. Tese losses are
disproportionately borne by residents
in the bottom half of the earnings
distribution.
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What explains these long-term
impacts? We are actively working on
this question, but at a fundamental
level, employment opportunities shif
across areas more quickly than people
do.
Altogether, our research indicates
that recessions produce enduring
economic disruptions to local
economies, and this pattern has
existed for at least the past fve

Recessions produce enduring
economic disruptions to
local economies, and this
pattern has existed for at least
the past fve decades.
decades. Consequently, recessions
likely play a role in the shif of
economic activity across places over
time; this, in turn, has implications
for economic opportunity for people
who grow up in areas badly hit—
especially repeatedly—by recessions.
Te social safety net meant to deal
with cyclical, temporary labor
market disruption—unemployment
insurance, SNAP (food stamps), and
one-time cash grants—has not, in
the past, led areas to recover. Instead,
public policy may need to come up
with more extensive and longer-term
programs to help workers improve
their skills, help businesses retool,
and, more broadly, help communities
reinvest in economic development.
Financial support for this project was provided by the
U.S. Department of Labor Scholars Program.

Workforce Data
(and Knowledge)
under Pressure
Joshua D. Hawley
In the frst half of 2020, more
than 40 million people fled an initial
unemployment insurance claim, and
according to the U.S. Department of
Labor, over 33 million people were
collecting benefts—both all-time
highs (see Figure 1). As a result of
COVID-19 and its efect on the
economy, nearly every county in the
United States experienced record
unemployment growth in April, with
little improvement since.

Strengthening Workforce Data
Is Critical
To address such rampant
unemployment, policymakers
require more powerful and more
robust employment data systems
than currently exist. In my role as a
professor and researcher at the Ohio
State University, I worked with state
agencies and academic colleagues
to build a longitudinal data system
linking information from education,
workforce development, and social
services. Te linked data have
allowed researchers in government

and academia to study the impact of
individual outcomes for public policies,
such as employment or education. Te
book Data Science in the Public Interest:
Improving Government Performance in
the Workforce, recently published by
the Upjohn Institute (see p. 7 for more
details), describes how state-specifc
data systems like the one in Ohio can
help us improve the capacity to address
challenges such as the rapid increases
in unemployment (Hawley 2020).
I recommend four specifc steps:
1) Increase the use of administrative
records in employment statistics.
2) Better fund workforce data system
infrastructure.
3) Explore partnerships with private
organizations that have signifcant
data on the labor force.
4) Build on the partnerships between
universities and states to make use
of these data, especially to focus
attention on inequalities in the
labor market.

ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
n The COVID-19 pandemic is an unprecedented challenge for federal and state data
systems needed to design policy responses.
n States cannot improve their systems on their own but need federal investment and
collaboration with outside partners.

Brad J. Hershbein is a senior economist at the
Upjohn Institute, and Bryan A. Stuart is an
assistant professor of economics at George
Washington University.
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n Cloud computing and tiered access to data offer efficiency advantages, but both
the federal and many state systems need technology modernization for the shift to
happen.
n Partnerships with universities are critical to ensuring that data systems are used
to their full potential to solve social problems, including racial inequality in labor
markets.

